


**Secret**

25X1



HR



## STAFF NOTES:

# Soviet Union Eastern Europe

State Department review completed



**Secret**

172

25X1

October 1, 1975

25X1



25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001900030001-9

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001900030001-9

25X1

**SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE**

25X1

*C O N T E N T S*

October 1, 1975

Moscow Unrolls Red Carpet for Costa Gomes. . . . .	1
Romanian-Soviet Skirmishing Over History. . . . .	3

25X1

25X1

Moscow Unrolls Red Carpet for Costa Gomes

The Soviets are giving high visibility treatment to the visit of Portuguese President Costa Gomes. It seems to be an intentional effort to emphasize Moscow's desire for friendly relations with Lisbon and its generally favorable attitude on the situation in Portugal, despite the recent setbacks to the Portuguese Communists. Costa Gomes' arrival in the Soviet Union was carried live on Moscow television, and he was greeted by President Podgorny, Foreign Minister Gromyko, and Defense Minister Greckho. The Soviet press has referred to Costa Gomes' visit as being at the "summit level," strongly suggesting Gomes will see party leader Brezhnev.

In the buildup for the trip, the Soviet media have emphasized economic relations between the two countries. This suggests that Moscow will feel constrained to make some additional effort to help Portugal economically, although the Soviets have been notably reluctant to either propose or give any substantial aid to Lisbon.

The Soviets will probably press Costa Gomes to sign a joint declaration of friendship and cooperation, as he did in Poland, that incorporates the basic principles of the CSCE final act, pledges both sides to periodic political consultation, and commits them to "deepen and strengthen detente in Europe."

This probably will not be too much of a problem since Costa Gomes also signed a communique in Warsaw that supported the Soviet approach on a number of issues such as the Vienna force reduction negotiations and a world disarmament conference. Interestingly, that communique also referred to the importance of the US-USSR strategic arms limitation talks, and expressed hope for an early agreement.

October 1, 1975

Soviet optimism for a favorable outcome of the visit has probably been enhanced by the absence of Portuguese Foreign Minister Melo Antunes, who was forced to cancel his trip to Warsaw and Moscow because of the continuing political turmoil in Portugal. The Soviets see the way clear to use the visit to counter Western criticism of Moscow's interference in Portuguese internal affairs and to influence Costa Gomes to treat in their behalf with the new government in Lisbon.

October 1, 1975

Romanian-Soviet Skirmishing over History

According to the US embassy in Bucharest, the Romanians believe that the Soviets have launched a stepped-up historical attack on the legitimacy of Romanian claims to Bessarabia.

This region was annexed by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II in 1940 and has remained a bone of contention between Bucharest and Moscow since that time. The Romanians have been particularly irritated since a Brezhnev speech on the subject a year ago during the 50th anniversary celebration of Soviet Moldavia. The Soviet leader claimed that the forces of international imperialism joined with Romanian royalists to separate the land between the Prut and Dneiper rivers from Russia in 1918. He thus implied that Bucharest's claims only date back to the close of World War I. The Romanians, however, point out that such arguments ignore the millennium or more of Romanian sway in Bessarabia before 1812.

Fuel was added to the fire last March when *Sovietskaya Moldaviya* reviewed a book on "Moldavian Soviet Statehood and the Bessarabian Question" by A. M. Lazarev. The book is a sweeping condemnation of post-war Romanian historiography, which it claims is little different from that of the monarchy. Lazarev also criticizes a number of prominent Romanian historians by name, and attempts to show that they are no different from bourgeois Romanian chauvinist emigres on the subject. By contrast, he praises the pro-Soviet stand on Bessarabia taken by the Moscow-dominated Romanian party during the interwar years. Ceausescu has specifically criticized the party leadership of this period for adopting incorrect policies on the nationality question.

October 1, 1975

Bucharest's pre-1812 claims to the region are brushed aside by Lazarev on the grounds that "Moldavians" were never Romanians since the Romanian state did not come into being until 1877. The party program promulgated by Bucharest last year carefully documents the history of the Romanian state from its colonization by the Roman legions of Trajan down to modern times.

In several conversations with embassy officers, Romanian historians have bitterly attacked the Lazarev book. They describe it and several other articles in Soviet historical journals as a deliberate and well-organized attack on the Romanian interpretation of the Bessarabian question. The dispute may be headed for more fireworks when the Soviet-Romanian mixed historical commission meets this fall.

25X1

October 1, 1975

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001900030001-9

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001900030001-9



25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001900030001-9

**Secret**



**Secret**

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00865A001900030001-9